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.I. INTRODUCTION 1
Assume that you are a director on the board of Very Large Ameri-
can Bank. Very Large maintains offices throughout the world. As-
sume further that Very Large has branch offices in, inter alia,
Kuwait and Sri Lanka. On July 20, 1990, the Kuwait City branch of
Very Large accepts a one million dollar deposit from a mid-level
Kuwaiti official, while in Sri Lanka, the local Very Large branch bor-
rows one million dollars from Big Bank.
Contrary to expectations, on August 1, 1990, Iraq invades Kuwait.2
Very Large's Kuwait City branch is similarly overrun, and all assets
are confiscated by the Iraqi government. 3 In response to the Iraqi in-
vasion, the United Nations imposes economic sanctions on Iraq.4
As a result of the sanctions, Sri Lanka loses a large portion of its
tea market. 5 Over one hundred thousand migrant workers flee the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by returning to Sri Lanka. However, upon
their return few jobs are available to them.6 In addition, the war
with the Tamil Tigers7 is going poorly.8 On October 25, the Sri
1. At the time that this comment was initially written, the Iraqi military had
occupied Kuwait and the future of Kuwait was uncertain. This provided an excellent
factual background upon which to base a hypothetical scenario which would aid in
illustrating the issues presented in this comment.
Now that the Iraqi forces have been expelled from Kuwait, the lines between fact
and hypothetical may blur with time. For the convenience of the reader, the factual
basis of the hypothetical will be emphasized here.
The text accompanying footnotes 1,3,4,5,6,7 are all actual occurrences. The text
accompanying footnote 2 (Iraqi seizure of assets of foreign bank branches, herein
referring to intangible assets such as bank accounts) and 8 (moratorium on payment of
foreign currency debts by Sri Lanka) are hypothetical. Of course, Very Large and Big
Banks are hypothetical, as are any transactions in which they are involved. The
factual background is incorporated into the hypothetical to bring this academic
comment more in touch with the "real world."
2. L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
3. Such expropriation did not occur and it is only for hypothetical purposes that
such a statement is made.
4. L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
5. If They Get Bored With The War, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 1990, at 42.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The nation of Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, is an island off the coast of India's
Lankan military announces an upcoming "full-scale operation"
against the Tigers. 9 Such an operation requires arms. These arms
must be purchased on the world markets, using a hard currency -
such as the United States dollar. Consequently, the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment imposes a moratorium on all outflows of foreign currency.10
Very Large American Bank now has two distinct problems. In Ku-
wait, the Iraqis have seized all assets of the Kuwait City branch.
However, the depositor has managed to escape the country, and files
a lawsuit in New York demanding access to his deposit. In addition,
the first payment from the Sri Lankan branch is due to Big Bank,
but the currency restrictions imposed by the Sri Lankan government
forbid that branch from repaying its debt. Big Bank also files suit in
New York demanding payment from the head office of Very Large
American Bank.
Is the home office of Very Large obliged to honor the debts of its
overseas branches? In both cases the money received by the
branches is inaccessible to the home office of Very Large. These two
cases involve an aggregate liability of over two million dollars (in-
cluding interest), from which Very Large has received no benefit.
All of the parties involved are innocent, but Saddam Hussein" is not
likely to show up and accept liability.12 Someone must pay; the ques-
Southeast coast. The population is composed of two main ethnic groups, a Sinhalese
majority and a Tamil minority. The Tamil Tigers are a separitist insurgency which is
seeking to establish an independant Tamil state on the island of Sri Lanka. See, e.g.,
Bad Behaviour, ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 1991, at 34-35.
9. I&
10. While the text accompanying supra notes 4-7 is a report of actual occurences,
the imposition of "a moratorium on all outflows of foreign currency" is purely hypo-
thetical. But see infra notes 173-210 and accompanying text for real examples of coun-
tries imposing currency restrictions.
11. Saddam Hussein was, and as of the publication of this article, still is, the polit-
ical leader of Iraq. On July 18, 1990, Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing its oil. It soon
moved troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Ku-
wait, formally annexing Kuwait on August 8, 1990. On August 28, Kuwait was de-
clared to be the 19th province of Iraq.
On November 29, 1990, the United Nations Security Counsel authorized "all neces-
sary means" to free Kuwait after January 15, 1991. On January 12, 1991, Congress em-
powered President Bush with the authority to go to war with Iraq. War began on
January 16, 1991 with numerous bombing sorties against Iraq. Stepping-stones, ECONO-
MIST, January 19, 1991, at 20.
Saddam Hussein came to represent all that was bad in Iraq, to the extent that the
war seemed to be waged not against Iraq but against Saddam Hussein himself. See e.g.,
His War, His Peace, ECONOMIST, February 23, 1991, at 15. It is therefore ironic that
although the war resulted in the withdrawl of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Saddam Hus-
sein retained his power in Iraq, despite revolt in both the north and south of Iraq. See
generally Guess Who's Still Running Iraq, ECONOMIST April 6, 1991, at 39.
12. This is not presented facetiously. Saddam Hussein's hypothetical refusal to ac-
cept liability would be in keeping with the Act of State Doctrine. The Act of State
Doctrine will generally respect the ability of a sovereign, in this case Iraq, to act with
impunity within its own territorial boundaries. See irtfra notes 109-116 and accompa-
nying text. The liberation of Kuwait may produce some technical problems for this
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tion is who - the home office of the bank or the branch's creditors?
Along with the potential rewards of conducting business outside
the United States come the potential risks of operating outside its
protection. International business requires placing oneself under the
control of a foreign sovereign.13 A sovereign has the power to make
the rules and to change them at any time.
Consequently, conducting business abroad involves the risk that
the actions of a foreign sovereign will impair the ability of an Ameri-
can bank's foreign branch to repay its debts. This risk is called "sov-
ereign risk."1 4 As raised in the hypothetical scenario presented
above, there is a question as to which party must bear sovereign
risk.15
This comment is comprised of two basic parts. Part I of this com-
ment provides background as to the realm in which questions of allo-
cation of sovereign risk arise. Part II of this comment addresses the
comment. Since the occupation is merely used here to bolster a hypothetical, this com-
ment will assume that the Act of State Doctrine applies. Outside of this comment,
Saddam Hussein would be better advised to invoke Sovereign Immunity, a concept
which is beyond the scope of this comment.
13. See infra note 61.
14. Sovereign risk has been defined as "the risk that actions by the foreign gov-
ernment having legal control over the foreign branch and its assets would render the
branch unable to repay the deposit." Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd., 110 S.
Ct. 2034, 2041 (1990).
In addition to sovereign risk, there exists what is known as "country risk." Country
risk has been defined as "the possibility that sovereign borrowers of a particular coun-
try may be unable or unwilling to fulfill their foreign obligations." E. SYMONS & J.
WHITE, BANKING LAW 719 (2d ed. 1984). While country risk is beyond the scope of this
comment, many of the same factors that lead to country risk may eventually lead to
sovereign risk, as states attempt to alleviate debt problems by retaining a hold on
"hard currency" through currency restrictions. See infra notes 173-210 and accompa-
nying text (review of currency restriction cases).
The implications of country risk are real. In 1982, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and
Argentina each declared that it was going to limit debt repayments to interest only
and renegotiate payments of principal. Each year several countries renegotiate or
reschedule their debts. During the period of 1982-1984, over thirty-five countries
sought to renegotiate or reschedule their foreign debts. In 1986, the number of coun-
tries following a similar course was twenty-four, and in 1988, fifteen countries followed
suit. Kassa, A Safety Net for the Eurodollar Market?: Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v. Ci-
tibank, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 127 n.6 (1990).
15. The United States itself has been a source of realized sovereign risk in the
past. This has occurred most recently in the cases of the Iranian and Libyan asset
freezes. For discussions of these cases and their international banking repercussions,
see Leigh, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. 1986 L. Nos. 1567, 4048; 82
AM. J. INT'L. L. 132 (1988); Edwards, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Ira-
nian Assets Control Regulations, 75 AM. J. INT'L. L. 870 (1981). See also Smedresman
& Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 746-61 (1989).
approaches adopted by courts in resolving questions of allocation of
sovereign risk. Part I of this comment is divided into three sections.
The first section provides a brief introduction to the concept of the
"Eurodollar" and the Eurocurrency markets. The second section
traces the development of international branch banking, and the
American banking regulatory scheme. This section addresses the
Separate Entity Doctrine, a legal construction which treats branches
as independent from their home offices, and the concept of Debt Si-
tus, or where a debt is located. The final section of Part I introduces
the concept of interbank lending.
Part II of this comment addresses the substantive issue of alloca-
tion of sovereign risk. This is accomplished by analyzing cases in-
volving bank expropriation arising out of Communist revolutions in
Russia, Cuba and Vietnam. These expropriations may be analogized
to the hypothetical seizure of Very Large's Kuwait City branch by
the conquering Iraqis. Additionally, a newer aspect of sovereign risk,
currency restrictions, is analyzed. The actions of the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment in the hypothetical situation introduced above represent the
currency restriction aspect of sovereign risk.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Eurocurrency Markets
Eurocurrency is any money outside the territorial control of the
nation which issues it.16 For example, a United States dollar in Eng-
land is a Eurodollar, and a Japanese Yen in the United States is like-
wise a Euroyen. Currency out of the territorial control of the
country which issues it is no longer considered "coin of the realm."x7
It is merely another commodity which may be bought, sold or bar-
tered.' 8 Regulations on the use of Eurocurrency are based on those
of the country in which the Eurocurrency is found, not upon those of
the issuing country.19 Eurocurrency accounts generally are held for
three purposes: (1) to allow banks to loan money to borrowers at
lower interest rates than are available within the country which is-
sued the currency; (2) to enable banks to pay depositors higher rates
of interest on their deposits; and (3) to facilitate international
transactions. 20
Suppose a Japanese manufacturer builds cars in a factory in Thai-
16. KIDWELL & PETERSON, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 666
(3d ed. 1987).
17. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 750.
18. See generally Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517
(1926) (obligations in terms of a country's currency assume the risk of fluctuation of
that currency).
19. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 743.
20. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 668. On May 22, 1991, the U.S. Treas-
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land, and ships them via a Korean shipping line to an American end
user. The American pays in United States dollars to the American
branch of Very Large Bank. The Japanese manufacturer wishes to
receive Thai Baht to pay factory employees, Korean Won to pay the
shipping company, and Yen for the home office in Japan. Rather
than purchase the various currencies on the open market, Very
Large Bank maintains accounts in all currencies at its American
branch and pays at once. This procedure helps to eliminate the risk
of currency fluctuations.2 1
Many American banks maintain United States dollar accounts
abroad. In addition to facilitating inter-currency transactions,
Eurodollar accounts are a means of avoiding United States banking
regulations.22 All banks which operate in the United States are re-
quired to maintain a certain percentage of their assets in reserve.
These funds may not be loaned, and consequently are a liability for
the bank.23 Since the bank may not loan this money and is simulta-
neously required to pay interest to its depositors, the funds to cover
this cost must come from profit gleaned from other loans. This is
coupled with further federal restrictions on interest rates.24 When a
bank operates outside the United States, it is not subject to United
States reserve and interest rate requirements.25 Accordingly, it may
reap greater profit while paying its depositors a higher rate of
ury Bill Market Rate, one year rate was 5.80 - 5.78, while the one year Eurodollar rate
was 6.50 - 6.625. L.A. Times, May 22, 1991, at D7, col. 6.
21. In the realm of international banking and finance, money is a commodity. Dif-
ferent currencies may be more or less attractive to investors at a particular point in
time. The amount of one currency required to purchase a unit of another currency is
the "currency exchange rate."
For example, on or about May 10, 1991, one hundred thirty-eight Japanese Yen
would be required to purchase one United States Dollar. The Yen to Dollar exchange
rate would be 138. Trade, Exchange Rates and Reserves, ECONOMIST, May 11, 1991, at
100.
Exchange Rates are not static, but move according to market forces. SYMONS &
WHITE, supra note 14, at 721. The change in the exchange rate can be called a "cur-
rency fluctuation." Again, for illustrative purposes, the Yen to Dollar exchange rate
on about May 10, 1990 was 158. As such, the value of the Dollar dropped twenty Yen
between May 10, 1990 and May 10, 1991. This is a decrease of almost thirteen percent,
a real loss to the holder of United States Dollars. This is a real life demonstration of
the risk involved due to currency fluctuations to any international business.
22. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 744. See also 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(6)
(1989); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(e)(5) (1989).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 204.1-.124 (1990). See also Hannigan, United States Home Bank Li-
ability for Foreign Branch Deposits, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 735, 738 n.21.
24. 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1990).
25. Hannigan, supra note 23, at 738.
interest.26
The Eurodollar market began to emerge after the end of World
War II. While the sun still shone on the English Empire, the pound
was the dominant currency of international trade, with England the
"center of international finance." 27 In 1957, England faced a "sterling
crisis." This led to the prohibition of the foreign use of the pound by
non-U.K. residents.28 By the 1950's, English banks found themselves
in the position of no longer being able to make international sterling
loans, while holding large amounts of United States dollars.29
These dollar holdings were largely the result of the Marshall
Plan.30 This money was kept in English banks because of their prior
experience with international transactions, America's close alliance
with the United Kingdom, and the fact that few American banks
were established in Europe.3 ' American businesses seeking to estab-
lish themselves in the new overseas markets also made use of Eng-
lish banks by adding to the Marshall Plan funds.3 2
Meanwhile, Eastern bloc nations removed their funds from the
United States. This effort was led by the Soviet Union, which with-
drew its dollar deposits to avoid possible expropriation by the United
States.33 The Soviet government had repudiated bonds issued by the
former Czarist government, many of which were held by American
investors.3 4 In 1963, President Kennedy called for the imposition of
an "Interest Equalization Tax."3 5 The tax, approved by Congress,
was designed to raise interest rates in the United States to the level
of then current European interest rates. The tax remained in effect
until 1974,36 by which time it had "discourage[d] U.S. investors from
buying certain foreign securities and thus forced the reopening of
capital markets in Europe . . . [and] had the effect of creating the
26. 12 C.F.R. § 204.128 (1990). See also infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
27. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 613.
28. REVEL, THE BRITISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM 295 (1982).
29. See infra notes 30-38, and accompanying text.
30. On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Jr. proposed an aid
plan for rebuilding post-World War II Europe. This plan has since been referred to as
the Marshall Plan. See 52 Fed. Reg. § 20695 (1987).
31. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 614 (the strong ties between
America and England can be demonstrated by their alliance during the Second World
War).
32. I&
33. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 669.
34. Id
35. The Interest Equalization Tax, as well as the Foreign Credit Restraint Pro-
gram and the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations (which were similarly designed
to provide disincentives to American domination of the post-war European capital
markets), were all repealed on January 1, 1974. See Kassa, supra note 14, at 132 n.43.
36. Id.
[Vol. 18: 561, 1991] Parent Bank Liability for Foreign Branch Deposits
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
largest international capital market the world has known."3 7 Largely
through United States action, the raw materials (dollars) and the
mechanism (international capital markets) created what began as the
Eurodollar, and became the Eurocurrency capital markets.38
The United States dollar, the successor currency to the sterling,
was soon found throughout the world as the result of U.S. aid and
investment. Currently, the Deutchemark and the Yen are widely
used on the international market. However, the dollar retains its
place as the most widely used Eurocurrency.39
B. International Branch Banking
1. The Regulatory System
The American banking system is a dual system. Both state govern-
ments and the federal government may charter a bank.40 The cur-
rent regulatory scheme is an amalgamation of competing state and
federal regulations coupled with the New Deal's efforts to reform the
failing banking system of the 1930s.41 The primary regulatory body
for nationally chartered banks is the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC).42 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System also exerts regulatory power over national banks, and is simi-
larly responsible for monitoring state banks which are members of
the Federal Reserve System.43 State regulations, of course, also con-
trol the actions of domestic banks.4"
The Federal Reserve System was created by the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913.45 All national banks are required to become members of
the Federal Reserve System, and state banks are allowed to join.46
The Federal Reserve System is divided into twelve districts across
37. R. TENNEKOON, LECTURE (1989) (citing J. WATKINS, CURRENT ISSUES OF INTER-
NATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 19 (1985)).
38. See Kassa, supra note 14, at 1288 n.17, 18, 131 n.40.
39. Kassa, supra note 14, at 131-33.
40. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 46. For early cases dealing with the
United States banking system, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
41. For the history of the current banking regulatory scheme, see generally SY.
MONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 1-67.
42. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1989).
43. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 42.
44. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 36.
45. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 221-530 (Supp. 1990).
46. For national banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1989); for state banks, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 321 (1989).
the United States, and is headed by a seven-member Board of Gover-
nors.47 Today the Federal Reserve is primarily used like a central
bank to control U.S. money supply, set interest rates, and act as a
general clearing house for checks.48
The pervasive and widespread bank failures of the 1920s revealed
drastic inadequacies in the then current banking regulatory
scheme. 49 In response, the Banking Act of 1933 was passed.50 Per-
haps the most important provision of this act was the creation of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).5' The FDIC pro-
vides deposit insurance for the accounts of member banks.52 As a re-
sult, the FDIC is in a position to provide "the most pervasive
regulation of the banking industry since its ranks include virtually
all of the nation's . . . commercial banks."53 Indeed, all banks, na-
tional or state, which are members of the Federal Reserve System
are automatically qualified for FDIC protection and consequently,
FDIC regulation. Nonmember banks may also qualify for FDIC
protection. 54
National banks may open branches within a state to the same ex-
tent that state law allows state banks to branch.5 5 A provision of the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 allowed national banks to establish
branches overseas.56 These international branches, however, require
the prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board.57
American banks did not begin to take advantage of their ability to
establish overseas branches until well after the United States had be-
come the major post-World War II power.58 The number of United
States banks maintaining foreign offices grew from just eight in 1960,
to one hundred and sixty-three in 1984.59 By 1987, nine hundred and
two foreign offices were being operated by United States banks.60
47. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1989).
48. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 35-40. The turmoil caused by the inordi-
nate number of bank failures coupled with the risk of forced closure affecting even
sound banks due to national panic led President Roosevelt to declare a "bank holiday,"
during which all banks suspended activities to prevent "runs" from occurring. Id. at
37-40, for a transcript of President Roosevelt's subsequent radio address to the nation
describing the reasons behind the bank holiday. See also Exec. Order No. 6073 (1933)
(regulations for lifting of emergency bank holiday).
49. See Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 227 (1989)).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1989).
51. Id.
52. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 41.
53. Id. at 42. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (1989).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1989) (application process).
55. The modern articulation of this rule is found at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1989).
56. 12 C.F.R. § 211.3 (1990); 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1989).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1989).
58. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 744.
59. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 615.
60. Kassa, supra note 14, at 126 & n.2.
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This growth is due in large part to a sympathetic legal environment,
as foreign branches are, excluded from U.S. reserve maintenance re-
quirements6l and interest rate limitations.62
2. International Activities
A bank may maintain a presence in a foreign country in a variety
of ways, depending on the extent of a presence it wishes to maintain,
and the type of presence the host country allows.63 There are five
basic methods by which an American bank may establish a foreign
presence. A lower level presence may be maintained through repre-
sentative offices, 64 shell branches65 and/or the development of corre-
spondent banking relationships. 66 A higher level presence may be
maintained through a foreign subsidiary67 or branch.68
A representative office may not engage in banking activity. In-
stead, it enables an American bank to familiarize itself with a foreign
market, and to introduce itself to the local banking and business com-
munities.6 9 Another function of a representative office is to act as a
61. 12 C.F.R. § 204.1 (1990), which provides in pertinent part: "(b) Purpose. This
part relates to reserves that depository institutions are required to maintain.... (c)(5)
The provisions of this part do not apply to any deposit that is payable only at an office
located outside the United States." (Regulation D).
62. 12 C.F.R. § 217.1 (1990), which provides in pertinent part: "(c)(2) For deposits
held by a member bank or a foreign bank, this regulation [establishing interest rate
ceilings for deposits] does not apply to 'any deposit that is payable only at an office
located outside the United States'...." (citing 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(t) (1990). (RegulationQ).
Any deposit that is payable only at an office located outside the United States
"means (1) a deposit of a United States resident that is in a denomination of
$100,000 or more, and as to which the depositor is entitled, under the agree-
ment with the institution, to demand payment only outside the United States
or (2) a deposit of a person who is not a United States resident as to which
the depositor is entitled . . . to demand payment only outside the United
States."
12 C.F.R. § 204.2(t) (1990).
63. For example, Canada requires foreign banks to operate only through locally
incorporated subsidiaries. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 741 n.19 (citing
Canada Bank Act, 1 CAN., REV. STAT. ch. B-1, § 302(1)(b) (1985)). In contrast, South
Vietnam required foreign banks to operate only through branches. See Trinh v. Ci-
tibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990). Most
"major host countries," such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Switzerland, France and Japan, allow foreign banks to operate either through
branches or subsidiaries. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 741.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(6) (1990).
65. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 620.
66. Id. at 622.
67. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(i) (1990).
68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 601, 615(b) (1989).
69. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 620.
liaison between American customers and local banks.70 Similarly, a
shell branch seldom interacts with the public. A shell branch is pri-
marily concerned with interbank money market transactions. 71 The
main purpose of a shell branch is to provide an American bank with
a branch in a tax haven, such as the Bahamas or the Cayman Is-
lands.72 This is the most common form of "international presence"
banks maintain.73 When an American bank is precluded from estab-
lishing a presence of its own in a foreign country, it may establish a
correspondent relationship with a foreign bank to facilitate interna-
tional transactions. 74
An American bank may also establish itself abroad in the form of a
locally incorporated bank. In this case, the foreign office is truly a
separate entity from the home office, although such subsidiaries are
generally wholly owned by an American institution.75 As such, this
is the easiest means of insulating the home office from liability for
the failure of a foreign branch to pay its debts.76 Banks however, un-
like most other international businesses, have generally not opted to
venture abroad through subsidiaries.77
The most common form of foreign involvement for banks is
through the establishment of a branch office.78 A branch is a "legal
and operational part of the parent bank."79 Foreign branches are
subject to both American law and the law of their host country.80
Foreign branches benefit from the name recognition and reputation
of their parent and the belief that the assets of the parent will back
the liabilities of the branch.81 As this comment will demonstrate,
however, such a belief is not always well founded.
3. The Separate Entity Doctrine
In the early part of the twentieth century, as a domestic branch
banking system was developing, courts developed the concept of the
branch as a separate entity from the home office.82 One of the first
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 620-21.
73. Id. See also Comment, Reducing Liability of American Banks for Expropri-
ated Foreign Branch Deposits, 34 EMORY L.J. 201, 205 (1985).
74. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 622.
75. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 624; Comment, supra note 73, at 208.
76. Id.
77. Comment, supra note 73, at 207.
78. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 14, at 746.
79. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 622-23.
80. Id.
81. Id. See also Comment, supra note 73, at 207-08.
82. Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762, 767 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925) ("[B]ranches and a parent bank are to be consid-
ered as separate entities."); Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 744,
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articulations of the separate entity doctrine is found in the 1916 case
of Chrzanowska v. Corn Exchange Bank,83 where the court stated
that "different branches [are] as separate and distinct from one an-
other as from any other bank."84 The separate entity doctrine has
been maintained in situations where the bank's assets are being at-
tached,85 as well as when attachment of a depositor's account is
sought.8 6
The initial rationale for the doctrine stems from the very real
problems posed by the inefficient means of communications extant at
the time.8 7 Branches generally operated as independent cost and
profit centers, with little commingling of assets and liabilities be-
tween the branch and home office.8 8 Modernly, federal statute re-
quires that the accounts of foreign branches be kept separate from
one another and from the home office. At year end, the branch's
profit or loss is then transferred to the home office's books as a sepa-
rate ledger item.8 9 In addition, the Freedom from Federal Reserve
requirements and interest rate limitations are dependent on main-
taining this distinction.90
249 N.Y.S. 319, 321-22 (1931) ("Not only are branch banks separate entities, but depos-
its made in a branch bank are payable there only .... A branch bank being separately
indebted to its depositor, the existing obligation lies primarily between such branch
bank and its depositor.").
83. 173 A.D. 285, 159 N.Y.S. 385 (1916), aff'd per curiam, 225 N.Y. 728, 122 N.E.
877 (1919).
84. 1& at 291, 159 N.Y.S. at 388.
85. See, e.g., Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 249 N.Y.S. 319
(1931); Chrzanowska v. Corn Exch. Bank, 173 A.D. 285, 159 N.Y.S. 385 (1916), off'd per
curiam, 225 N.Y. 728, 122 N.E. 877 (1919); Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1950).
86. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 11 N.Y.2d 936, 183 N.E.2d 227,
228 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1962). In McC7oskey, Chase Manhattan's New York home office
sought attachment of the account of a customer of a Chase branch office in Germany.
The court found that "[b]alances maintained by the individual in the German branch
were payable only in Germany at that branch and ... the funds were not subject to
attachment in New York." Id But see United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 384 (1965) (The branch bank's affairs are ... as much within the reach of the in
personam order entered by the District Court as are those of the home office).
87. See, e.g., Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
Unless each branch of a bank is treated as a separate entity . . . no branch
could safely pay a check drawn by its depositor without checking with all
other branches and the main office to make sure that no warrant of attach-
ment had been served upon any of them .... This would place an intolerable
burden upon banking and commerce, particularly where the branches are nu-
merous, as is often the case.
Id at 476.
88. Comment, supra note 73, at 216.
89. 12 U.S.C. § 604 (1989).
90. 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(b), 204.1(c)(5), 204.2(t) (1989) (setting forth Regulation D re-
Modem communications abilities have decreased the necessity of
maintaining a strict legal separation between branch and home office.
The separate entity doctrine has eroded, and is sometimes even ig-
nored in the post-1960 era.91 A somewhat nebulous restriction of the
separate entity doctrine occurs when a foreign branch and a home of-
fice fail to maintain an arms-length relationship.92 Further, the sepa-
rate entity doctrine may be waived by contract. In the case of
contractual time deposits, 93 courts may hold that the terms of the in-
strument make it the debt of every office a bank operates if payment
of the foreign deposit is guaranteed by a domestic banking office.94
C. Debt Situs
Returning to the hypothetical of Very Large Bank, one may ob-
serve that in both of Very Large's invasion related trials, Kuwait citi-
zen v. Very Large and Citybank Bombay v. Very Large, the plaintiffs
are attempting to place liability on the home office for deposits ac-
cepted at Very Large's branches. Very Large's first line of defense
against these claims is to invoke the separate entity doctrine. Since
the deposits are the debt of the branches, and the branches are le-
gally separate entities from the American parent bank, the plaintiffs'
only cause of action is against the branches themselves. If the sepa-
rate entity doctrine is still viable, the plaintiffs will have to circum-
vent the doctrine. Perhaps the simplest and most effective means to
accomplish this task is to state that the debt is not located at the
branch, but rather at the parent, in which case the separate entity
doctrine will not apply.
Therefore, the concept of the situs of a debt is an important issue
in cases seeking to place liability on the home office for debts in-
curred at foreign branch offices.
In order for the separate entity doctrine to have effect, a court
must determine that the debt in question is located solely in the
branch office. 95 If a debt were to have its situs in the home office of
a bank, despite the fact that the debt was first created at a branch,
quiring separation of foreign and domestic accounts to allow foreign deposit exemption
from U.S. reserve requirements). See also 12 U.S.C. § 604 (1989) (foreign branch ac-
counts must be operated independently of accounts in the domestic home office); 12
U.S.C. § 461(b)(6); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)(5) (1982) (lack of Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration coverage for foreign branches). See also SYMONS AND WHITE, supra note 14 at
752.
91. Hannigan, supra note 23, at 745.
92. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616, 618-19 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
93. A time deposit is a deposit made with a bank which cannot be withdrawn
before a prescribed date without a penalty. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at
164.
94. Hannigan, supra note 23, at 744.
95. Id. at 742-45.
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the separate entity doctrine would be inapplicable. 96 The issue is not
a simple one, for "[t]he situs of intangible property is about as intan-
gible a concept as is known to the law."97 Debt situs issues are also
of primary importance in determining the applicability of the act of
state doctrine.98
Early cases resolved questions of debt situs under conflict of laws
procedures.99 These cases rely on the presumption that a debt has a
sole situs at the branch of deposit.100 However, courts are not always
apt to adopt such a position. Justice Cardozo first introduced the
concept of a debt having a situs simultaneously in several distant lo-
cations, notably, at both the branch and home office of a bank.O1
D. Interbank Lending
Very Large bank is in trouble. Its London branch has a shortage of
sterling, and an important customer wants to draw out a large sum
against his line of credit. Fortunately, Small English Bank happens
to have a surplus of sterling on hand. Very Large borrows the ster-
ling it needs from Small English, and lends the money to its cus-
tomer. This is an example of interbank lending at its simplest form.
Given the large number of banks in operation throughout the
world and the similarly large diversity of available currencies, there
are always some banks with a surplus of one currency and a deficit of
another. To facilitate the process of getting currencies to where they
are needed, banks have developed their own system of interbank
lending. Due to the speed with which such transactions must now oc-
cur, "[d]eposit taking and making is often conducted by telephone
96. Id.
97. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
98. See infra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
99. See Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253 (1927) (debt created by deposit in
Austria-Hungary held to be discharged under the law of Austria-Hungary and there-
fore not collectible in the United States); Die Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v.
Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926) (deposit made in Germany is subject to currency fluctu-
ations in Germany and to German law); Dunn v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 374 F.2d 876
(5th Cir. 1967) (Canadian government could tax United States dollar account, estab-
lished in Canada through contract with Texas citizens).
100. See, e.g., Edwards, Jr., supra note 15, at 877 n.34. ("The choice-of-law rule ap-
plied by most courts is that the law governing the contractual relationship of a bank
and its depositor when a deposit is placed with a branch, in the absence of an explicit
statement by the parties, is the law of the place where the branch is sited."). See also
Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990).
101. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 231 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924). See infra
notes 120-27, 231 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924) and accompanying text.
and evidenced merely by terse telex messages containing the bare es-
sential terms."1 02
The primary interbank lending market is found in London, Eng-
land. The interest rate at which such loans are made is LIBOR, the
London InterBank Offering Rate.103 LIBOR therefore represents
the rate at which banks can "buy" money. Similarly, the Federal Re-
serve facilitates interbank transfers of funds in the United States.
The Federal Reserve also sets the rate, the United States Prime Rate,
at which banks located in America may "buy" money.104 Conse-
quently, most international loans are calculated using either LIBOR
or the U.S. Prime Rate.105
II. TREATMENT BY THE COURTS
A. Inability of a Foreign Office to Pay its Debts
American parent bank (home office) liability for foreign branch de-
posits reflects the patchwork system of regulation extant in the rest
of the banking regulatory scheme. While the rationale behind the
separate entity doctrine has weakened, treatment of branches as sep-
arate entities must still be addressed.'0 6 Concomitant with this doc-
trine is the concept of debt situs.l0 7 Once the situs of a debt is
determined, the court must determine which legal doctrines are ap-
plicable.108 Since the actions of a foreign sovereign are involved, a
court will have to take into account the extent to which political ac-
tion and separation of powers are involved. This is determined under
the penumbra of the act of state doctrine. 09 Underlying all of the
doctrines, procedures and rules, simple contract law and allocation of
risk exist."10
1. The Act of State Doctrine
In the hypothetical scenario which introduced this comment, the
102. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 740.
103. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 16, at 670. It is interesting to note that
Eurodollar interbank transactions are also cleared in the United States. Such transac-
tions occur via the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transfers (SWIFT). For
an illustration of the procedures involved, see Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note
15, at 745. For an example of the legal effects that this procedure may have in the
event of realized sovereign risk, see Leigh, supra note 15, at 132-36.
104. KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 14, at 177-79.
105. Id. at 670. As of May 21, 1991, the U.S. prime rate was 8.50, while the six
month LIBOR rate was 6.25. L.A. Times, May 22, 1991, at D7, col. 5.
106. See Hannigan, supra note 23, at 744-45.
107. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
108. This will be illustrated by the analysis of cases presented in this section.
109. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
110. "The deposit relationship is, in fact, mainly a matter of contract between bank
and depositor." Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 739.
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Kuwait City branch of Very Large American Bank was overrun by
invading Iraqi armies. This was followed by a hypothetical Iraqi
proclamation that the assets of the seized branch were now the prop-
erty of Iraq. This is an example of sovereign expropriation of a for-
eign branch of a United States bank.
American jurisprudence has long held that the acts of a foreign
sovereign which come to fruition within that sovereign's territorial
control are outside the purview of American courts.'' While the ra-
tionale for the rule has shifted from one of comity between nations"12
to one of separation of powers,"i 3 the end result remains the same;
the acts of a foreign sovereign within its own territory will generally
be held beyond the powers of American courts to review." 4 This
rule of judicial restraint is called the act of state doctrine.
Territorial limitations are a major aspect of the act of state doc-
trine."l 5 This has led to some confusion when the property affected
is intangible, such as in the case of a debt.116 The major question in
deciding whether to apply the act of state doctrine in the case of
111. See 45 Am. JUR. 2D International Law §§ 83-87 (1969).
112. The first articulation of the act of state doctrine is found in Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgement on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be.obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id, at 252.
113. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). Cf Alfred Dun-
hill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976) (purely commercial,
rather than political, conduct of Cuba is not an act of state implicating separation of
powers).
The separation of powers rationale led to the so-called Bernstein exception, which
allowed for the abrogation of the act of state doctrine when the Executive branch in-
formed the court that the act of state doctrine was not applicable. Bernstein v. N. V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
This exception was repudiated by six Justices in a plurality of opinions in First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 897
(1972). The second circuit, however, was unconvinced that the Bernstein exception
was overruled and decided to reinstate it, albeit in a more restricted version, in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 882-84 (2d Cir. 1981) (in ad-
dition to Executive branch waiver of the act of state doctrine, there must be no inter-
ference with foreign relations and the claim against the foreign sovereign must be
asserted by counterclaim not exceeding the value of the sovereign's claim).
114. 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 83 (1989).
115. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 ("[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government.").
116. Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign
Branches, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903, 963 (1979).
bank expropriations is deciding the location, or situs of the debt.117 If
the debt situs can be shown to be outside the territorial control of the
foreign sovereign, the act of state doctrine need not be applied. 1 8
2. Sovereign Expropriation
The disputes brought before the courts are generally between the
bank and its depositors.119 It is the bank, which has suffered the
seizure of its foreign branch, that will argue for the applicability of
the act of state doctrine to avoid payment to its depositors at the ex-
propriated branch. These are cases where generally "both ... are in-
nocent parties and, to a great extent, victims of circumstances beyond
their control. However.... it is [the] job [of the] court to determine
which of [the] parties is to suffer the loss."'120 Courts have ap-
proached the issue of the applicability of the act of state doctrine on a
case-by-case basis.121 The incidence of sovereign expropriations of
American foreign branch banks is actually quite limited. It is gener-
ally in the wake of successful communist revolutions that these cases
have arisen. Consequently, the law has developed from the Russian
revolution through the rise of Castro and the fall of Vietnam.
a. Russia
The leading case law from the Russian revolution can be found in
the New York Sokoloff cases. 122 Between the fall of Czarist Russia
and the birth of the Soviet Union, Boris Sokoloff deposited United
States dollars with National City Bank (National) in New York to be
converted to rubles and made available in Petrograd. 123 Sokoloff
117. See, e.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 650 (2d Cir.
1984) ("[I]f the situs of Chase's debt to Garcia were in Cuba, the Cuban government
could validly seize it."). See also, Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs
Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1986).
118. Hannigan, supra note 23, at 749.
119. See, e.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 651 ("We are simply resolving a private dispute
between an American bank and one of its depositors.").
120. Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1172 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 2602 (1990).
121. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
316 n.38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) ("Act of state analysis depends
upon a careful case-by-case analysis of the extent to which the separation of powers
concerns on which the doctrine is based are implicated by the action before the
court.").
122. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928) (ruling on the
appropriate remedy); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924)
(ruling on propriety of claim against home office).
123. On June 27, 1917, Sokoloff deposited funds with the New York home office of
National City Bank. Sokoloff, 250 N.Y. at 73. In September of 1917, Sokoloff received
a passbook from the Petrograd branch of National City Bank. Id. at 74. The Commu-
nists eventually took power and subsequently issued decrees nationalizing Russian
banks and later confiscating the accounts of depositors as a "revolutionary tax." Sokol-
off, 239 N.Y. at 167.
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then sought to transfer a portion of the funds from Petrograd to
Kharkoff. During the transfer, the funds became lost as a result of
the communication difficulties of the Russian State Bank, through
which such transfers were accomplished.124 Thereafter, while the
transfer of monies from the Petrograd branch of National was still in
an executory stage, the then successful Bolsheviks nationalized all
banks in Russia and seized all individual accounts.125
Sokoloff sued National City Bank in New York in an attempt to
recover the balance of his Petrograd account. Justice Cardozo, then
with the New York Court of Appeals, propounded what could be con-
sidered the multiple situs and springing situs theories. 2 6 The court
found the situs of National's debt to Sokoloff to be wherever the
bank maintained a presence. "The intangible chose in action, at least
when it is the result of a deposit in a bank, has for some purposes a
situs at the residence or place of business of the debtor."127 Locating
the situs of National's debt in the United States was predicated on
the expectations of the creditor. "Plaintiff did not pay his money to
the defendant . . . upon the security of the Russian assets. He paid
his money to a corporation organized under our laws upon the secur-
ity of all its assets, here as well as elsewhere."'1 28 The situs of the
debt could further be considered to "spring back" to the United
States home office upon closure of a branch. "[A] decree of confisca-
tion directed against depositors does not reduce the liabilities of a
bank which has already yielded up its assets in virtue of a decree of
124. See Sokoloff, 250 N.Y. at 77.
125. Sokoloff, 239 N.Y. at 167.
126. Multiple situs theory holds that the debt is located both at the branch and at
the home office. Springing situs theory holds the site of the debt to be the branch, yet
"springing back" to the home office upon closure of the branch. "Everything in Russia
might have been destroyed by fire or flood, by war or revolution, and still the defend-
ant would have remained bound by its engagement." Sokoloff, 239 N.Y. at 167. See Vi-
shipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982), for an articulation of the springing situs doctrine.
127. Sokoloff, 239 N.Y. at 169.
128. Id. at 167. Cf. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 193
N.E. 897 (1934); Dougherty v. National City Bank, 157 Misc. 849, 285 N.Y.S. 491 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1935). Dougherty was distinguished from Sokoloff based on the site of the
initial deposit. While Sokoloff made his initial deposit in the United States, Dougherty
made his initial deposit in Russia. The New York Court of Appeals in Dougherty
found that in cases where the initial deposit taking was in Russia, Russian law applied.
The Soviet government was held to have assumed liability for the branch's debts.
These cases involved the application of Russian law as opposed to American law, dem-
onstrating the importance of conflict of laws, and of the ability of parties to contract
for their choice of law.
confiscation directed against itself."129
b. Cuba
In the wake of Castro's victory, American banks found their Cuban
branches expropriated.13 0 The twin cases of Garcia131 and Perez' 32
demonstrate the degree of latitude given to courts in examining de-
positors' rights in the wake of a branch expropriation. In Garcia, the
plaintiff and her husband were concerned with securing their money
in the face of the Cuban Revolution. Garcia approached the Vedado
(Cuban) branch of Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase). Accounts were
opened under the expressly stated desire to secure the money in the
midst of a revolution.133 Chase agreed to payment in U.S. dollars in
New York, or at any other Chase branch. In return for their depos-
its, Garcia and her husband received two non-negotiable certificates
of deposit (CDs).134
Chase's Cuban branches were subsequently nationalized, with the
National Bank of Cuba, Banco Nacional de Cuba, assuming the assets
and liabilities of the expropriated branches. Banco Nacional de Cuba
notified Chase that the Garcia "account" was closed and demanded
payment of monies equal to the value of the CDs. Chase paid the re-
quested monies. Garcia's husband subsequently sought to redeem the
matured CDs, to which Chase responded that all inquiries should be
tendered to the Banco Nacional de Cuba.135
Chase's argument was based on the language in the CDs which al-
lowed repayment at any Chase office. Chase argued that the debt to
Garcia consequently had its situs at every Chase office, including
Cuba. As such, the Cuban decree demanding payment of Garcia's ac-
count affected monies which had their situs in Cuba. Thus, the act of
state doctrine was applicable and the monies could be seized by the
Cuban government i3 6
This argument was dismissed by the court for a variety of reasons.
The payment to the Cuban government was analogized to a "run of
the mill" bank robbery which was insufficient to extinguish Chase's
129. Id at 168-69.
130. See Hannigan, supra note 23, at 747.
131. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
132. Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474
N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984).
133. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646.
134. Id. A certificate of deposit (CD) is "an acknowledgment by a bank of receipt
of money with an engagement to repay it." U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(c) (1987). For a discus-
sion of the role of the CD in international banking, see Smedresman & Lowenfeld,
supra note 15, at 739-41.
135. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646-48.
136. Id. at 648-49.
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debt to Garcia.137 "Chase's debt... was not extinguished merely be-
cause it was forced to pay an equivalent sum of its own money to a
third party."138 Chase's payment to the Cuban government was a
voluntary "loss," for which the bank must accept liability.139 Further
support for treating Chase's payment as voluntary arises from stan-
dard banking law. "[A] bank cannot be compelled to pay a certificate
of deposit issued by it, without the production and surrender of the
certificate.... A bank acts at its peril in paying. a certificate without
surrender thereof and endorsement.. . ."140
The court further noted that it would have held Chase liable to
Garcia based solely on the terms of the CD. "The purpose of the
agreement between Chase and... Garcia was to ensure that, no mat-
ter what happened in Cuba, including seizure of the debt, Chase
would still have a contractual obligation to pay the depositors upon
presentation of their CDs."'14 1 Consequently, the terms of the con-
tract (CD) were interpreted to remove the situs of Chase's debt to
Garcia out of Cuba, thus rendering the debt immune from the actions
of the Cuban government.142
In contrast, Perez, a case with nearly identical facts to Garcia, and
decided by the New York Court of Appeals within two days of Gar-
cia, reached the opposite conclusion.143 The Perez court held, as did
the Garcia court, that the CD was redeemable at any Chase
branch.144 The Perez court differed, however, in its view of the con-
sequences of this fact:
While the debt contemplated alternate places of payment and thus had multi-
ple situs, because it constituted but a single obligation to pay, payment at one
of the places chosen for performance extinguished the debt at all of its si-
tuses.... Chase's debt to [Perez] was satisfied by payment to the Cuban gov-
ernment in response to its confiscation of [Perez's] accounts, and at that point
the debt, wherever else it had been payable, was extinguished.
1 4 5
Perez is factually distinguishable from Sokoloff 146 and Vishipco.147
137. Id. at 649.
138. Id.
139. See Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1172 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2602 (1990).
140. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 649 (quoting 5B MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING, § 326a, at
317-18 (1983)).
141. Id. at 650.
142. Id. at 651.
143. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 776-78.
144. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 469-70, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693. Cf. Garcia, 735
F.2d at 649.
145. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 470, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
146. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928); Sokoloff v.
In both Sokoloff and Vishipco, the revolutionary government had na-
tionalized the foreign branch before confiscating the accounts in
question. In Perez, the order confiscating the account preceded the
nationalization of Chase's Cuban branches.X48 This distinction was
crucial in the court's decision. "For purposes of the Act of State doc-
trine, a debt is located within a foreign State when that State has the
power to enforce or collect it."'149 This rule of law, coupled with the
holding in Harris v. Balk,150 that "the power to enforce or collect a
debt has been dependent on the presence of the debtor,"'' 1 led the
Perez court to the conclusion that a taking had been affected by the
government of Cuba. The requirements of the act of state doctrine
were satisfied because the taking occurred within the territory of
Cuba. Accordingly, the taking was immune to American judicial
review.152
Perez may reflect the effort by states to limit the liability of Ameri-
can parent banks since the federal courts do not provide a similar
shield.15 3 Although the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged
the contemporaneous Garcia decision, it failed to adequately rebut
the rationale of the Garcia court.154 The Perez court also failed to
address the implicit contractual terms utilized in Garcia, which were
designed to protect depositors by allowing payment in New York.
The scheme for determining the applicability of the act of state
doctrine with regard to debt situs rules proffered by the Perez court
would create a regime ready to wreak havoc. By focusing solely on
the presence of the debtor to determine debt situs, any bank account
could be seized wherever a bank maintains a branch.
This is apparently the first case in which the rule has been applied to the Act
of State doctrine in such a way as to expose deposits made in an American
bank, payable in United States currency at any of its branches worldwide, to
confiscation by any country in which the bank maintains a branch office.1 5 5
The dissent in Perez advanced the use of a "jurisdiction over the
National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924). See supra notes 120-27 and ac-
companying text.
147. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
148. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 472, 463 N.E.2d at 10, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
149. Id, at 469, 463 N.E.2d at 8, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
150. 198 U.S. 215 (1905), rev'd on other grounds, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
151. Id. at 222-23.
152. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 469, 463 N.E.2d at 8, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
153. New York and Michigan have both enacted statutes which attempt to limit the
liability of American parent banks for foreign branch deposits. Hannigan, supra note
23, at 751-52 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.466 (1979); N.Y. BANKING LAw § 138 (Mc-
Kinney 1971)).
154. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 477, 463 N.E.2d at 13, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
155. Id. at 478, 463 N.E.2d at 13, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
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creditor" approach to resolving the question of debt situs.156 The dis-
sent viewed the seizure of assets by Cuba as the bank's loss "which it
now seeks to shift to the depositor by refusing to pay the account." 5 7
This approach is quite similar to the "bank robber" analogy used in
Garcia.58 In the view of the dissent, the bank was the party which
assumed the risk of revolution.
The essence of the relationship between the parties is that the bank agreed to
safeguard the depositor's money. It did so in the midst of a revolution ....
The bank specifically agreed that the certificates would be redeemed at any of
its branches... and further agreed to pay in United States currency. Even
after the revolution had succeeded, the bank remained in Cuba.... Under
these circumstances it could be said that the bank was fully aware of and ac-
cepted the risk of confiscation of its assets, and should not be permitted to re-
fuse to honor its commitment to this depositor after her arrival in this
country.15
9
c. Vietnam
The fall of Vietnam helped to further define the law regarding
bank expropriations. 16 0 The two major cases arising out of
Vietnamese expropriations are Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A.161 and Trinh v. Citibank, N.A..162 In both cases the Sai-
gon branch of an American bank closed its doors when North
Vietnamese occupation became imminent. The rationale by which
the courts found the home office liable was likewise parallel. Both
courts found the closing of the branch to be a voluntary action on the
part of the bank, and thus circumvented both the separate entity doc-
trine and the act of state doctrine by removing the situs of the debt
from Vietnam. 63 The closures were held to be voluntary despite the
fact that the offices were in fact seized by the conquering North
Vietnamese army within days of the closures.' 64
156. Id. at 479, 463 N.E.2d at 14, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
159. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 479-80, 463 N.E.2d at 14-15, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 698-99 (Wach-
tler, J., dissenting).
160. Pursuant to the Paris Accords of 1973, the United States withdrew all of its
forces from South Vietnam, culminating with the closure and evacuation of the United
States Embassy on April 24, 1975. On April 30, 1975, the North Vietnamese Army con-
quered South Vietnam. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 779.
161. 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
162. 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990).
163. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1167; Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 862.
164. On May 1, 1975, the new government issued a directive which stated: "All...
banks... together with documents, files, property and technical means of U.S. imperi-
alism and the Saigon administration-will be confiscated and, from now on, managed
by the revolutionary administration." Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 857. The North
Force majeure and impossibility of performance arguments were
held insufficient because of the close relationship between the home
and branch offices of a bank.165 As the court in Trinh stated, "[T]he
closing of a bank by revolutionary forces is the type of fortuitous
cause contemplated by the law of force majeure, we do not agree
that, where a parent/branch relationship is involved, application of
that doctrine requires the conclusion that the depositor is to bear the
risk of loss."166 In the view of the Vishipco court, the proposition
that the home office would be liable for the debts of the branch was
further supported by Vietnamese law which barred the creation of a
locally incorporated subsidiary.167 The Trinh court noted that by
limiting foreign involvement to branches, "Vietnamese law sought to
remove any ambiguity as to where the responsibility would ulti-
mately lie for the liabilities of branch banks."168
Following a similar rationale, the Vishipco court held that
[a] bank which accepts deposits at a foreign branch becomes a debtor, not a
bailee, with respect to its depositors. In the event that unsettled local condi-
tions require it to cease operations, it should [provide depositors] ... the op-
portunity to withdraw their deposits or, if conditions prevent such steps,
enable them to obtain payment at an alternative location.1 69
Force majeure and impossibility of performance defenses must fail
because an inability to satisfy a debt at a branch office is not a bar to
performance at other offices.170
A bank may seek to contractually limit its liability for losses re-
sulting from branch bank expropriation. The Vishipco court stated
that, "if the deposit contract had included an explicit waiver on the
part of the depositor of any right to proceed against the home of-
fice,"'1 71 such a clause may be upheld. However, "to be effective, such
limitation provisions must be explicit and must clearly and unmistak-
ably inform depositors that they have no right to proceed against the
home office."172 Thus, where a contractual provision absolved the
branch office from liability in the event of "government orders and
'any other cause beyond its control,'" it did not serve to absolve the
Vietnamese even went so far as to declare that "ITihe Vietnam National Bank. .. is
ready to recover former debts incurred by banks through lending and to conduct set-
tlement of debts, deposits, savings and all other sources of capital in the economy."
Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1166. Despite this apparent novation, the court still found liability
at Citibank's home office for reasons described infra.
165. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1170 (force majeure); Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 863-64 (impossi-
bility of performance).
166. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1170 (emphasis in original).
167. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 863.
168. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1169.
169. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 864.
170. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1169-70; Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 863-64. See Hannigan, supra
note 23, at 750-51.
171. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 863-64.
172. Trinh, 850 F.2d at 1170.
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home office of liability.173
3. Currency Restrictions
In the hypothetical which began this comment, the Sri Lankan
government prohibited the outflow of all foreign currency from the
country. This represents an aspect of sovereign risk, which is differ-
ent from the case of outright expropriation. In the case of expropria-
tion, all the assets of the seized branch are taken through the
exercise of sovereign action. The bank in such a case no longer main-
tains control over the assets to any degree. When a sovereign opts to
merely restrict the outflow of currency, the foreign branch maintains
the deposits but is no longer able to repay the depositor. For the de-
positor, the outcome is the same; the bank states that the depositor
no longer has access to his deposits.
The cases examined in this section deal with sovereign restriction
on repayment of a debt owed by a foreign branch. Nations faced with
a weak economy have sought to maintain possession of "hard" cur-
rencies, such as the United States dollar. In order to retain local con-
trol, Eurodollar debt payments were either restricted74 or converted
at an artificial rate to the local currency. 17 5
The first of these cases is Allied Bank Int v. Banco Credito Agric-
ola De Cartago.176 Allied was the agent bank for a syndicate of
thirty-nine banks. The syndicate lent money to three Costa Rican
banks "wholly owned by the Republic of Costa Rica and subject to
the direct control of the Central Bank of Costa Rica."'177 Prior to the
lawsuit, the Central Bank of Costa Rica issued orders suspending all
external debt payments. This was followed by a Costa Rican execu-
tive decree conditioning all such payments on the express approval of
the Central Bank. Such approval was again denied. The notes,
which were payable in the United States, were then accelerated and
Allied sued for the remaining principal and interest. 78
The case was originally decided in favor of the defendant banks.
Then, the court held that Costa Rica's actions "were fully consistent
173. Id, at 1169-70.
174. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990); Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola De Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
175. Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
176. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
177. Id. at 518.
178. Id at 518-19.
with the law and policy of the United States." 179 However, subse-
quent intervention by the United States government which argued
against such construction caused the court to vacate its prior opin-
ion.'8 0 The court then determined that the applicability of the act of
state doctrine was the deciding factor. 18 ' The decision hinged on the
"situs of the property at the time of the purported taking."18 2 The
court found that since the Costa Rican banks agreed to pay in United
States dollars by the terms of the promissory note, they had acceded
to the jurisdiction of a United States court. Accordingly, "Costa Rica
could not wholly extinguish the Costa Rican banks' obligation to
timely pay ... in New York. Thus the situs of the debt was not Costa
Rica."1 83 Since the situs of the debt was contracted out of Costa Rica,
the act of state doctrine was not applicable and no sovereign action
by Costa Rica could affect it.1s4
The 1985 case Braka v. Bancomer'8 5 also illustrates the use of cur-
rency restrictions. The plaintiffs in Braka were United States citi-
zens who purchased certificates of deposit (CDs) from the defendant
bank, Bancomer. Prior to the date of maturation of the CDs, the
Mexican government "banned the use of foreign currency as legal
tender" and "requir[ed] that all domestic obligations be performed by
delivery of an equivalent amount in pesos." 8 6 Subsequent decrees
nationalized Bancomer bank and established a proscribed exchange
rate at approximately half the actual market rate. The plaintiffs con-
sequently sued to recover damages based on breach of contract. 8 7
In Braka, the court held the act of state doctrine applicable. 8 8 In
contrast to Allied, the situs of the debt in this case was found to be in
Mexico. "The CDs named Mexico City as the place of deposit and of
payment of interest and principal. Although some of the CDs were
dollar-denominated, [Bancomer] never agreed to pay them in any lo-
cation other than Mexico."189 The fact that Bancomer had on occa-
sion accepted deposits through its New York agency had no bearing
179. 1d at 519.
180. Id, at 519-20.
181. Id. at 520.
182. Id. at 521.
183. I&
184. Id. at 522.
185. 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
186. Id at 223.
187. Id.
188. Id
189. Id at 224. See also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). De-
posits were made through an account held in Laredo, Texas, by Bancomer. The court
held the situs to be in Mexico, however, and therefore, the act of state doctrine applied
to bar liability. Id. at 1125.
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on the determination of debt situs.go
Despite the court's determination that the act of state doctrine ap-
plied in this case, plaintiffs sought to place liability with Bancomer.
Plaintiffs' argument was based on an exception to the act of state
doctrine, which provides that when a foreign government is engaged
in a purely commercial activity, its actions may not fall within the
purview of the act of state doctrine.191 The court rejected this con-
tention on the basis of the facts and theory. "This action, taken by
the Mexican government for the purpose of saving its national econ-
omy from the brink of monetary disaster, surely represents the 'exer-
cise [of] powers peculiar to sovereigns.' ",192 In addition, "Bancomer
ha[d] already paid plaintiffs all that it may under Mexican law."' 93
In Allied and Braka, the determining factor was court interpreta-
tion of the terms of a contract, whether implied or express. In the
case of a CD, there is generally a physical contract. The parties may
negotiate terms and banks may include the language necessary to
protect them from "sovereign risk."194 The same is generally true of
a demand account, although the depositor may be in a weaker negoti-
ating position. The difficulty arises in the case of interbank transfers.
Such transactions have historically been accomplished by telex.
Thus, the contractual terms are typically minimal.195 It is in this sit-
uation, with two sophisticated innocent parties, that the court must
determine which party bears "sovereign risk."
In the 1990 case of Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd.196
(WFAL), this question of who bears sovereign risk was posed to the
United States Supreme Court. A Wells Fargo Bank subsidiary in
Singapore made two term loans to Citibank's Manila branch office.'9 7
The deposit contract was oral with minimal written acknowledg-
ment. 98 Subsequently, prior to the maturation of the loans, the Phil-
190. Bancomer's New York office could be likened to the American shell or repre-
sentative office. Id. at 225 (quoting Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704).
191. Braka, 762 F.2d at 225. See also Dunhill, 425 U.S. 696-706.
192. Braka, 762 F.2d at 225.
193. Id
194. See supra note 12 (definition of sovereign risk).
195. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
196. 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990).
197. Of the approximately fifty institutions which had lent money to Citibank Ma-
nila only WFAL opted to litigate Citibank's inability to repay the principle due on its
debt. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 763-64.
198. The written terms of the contract between WFAL and Citibank Manila were
essentially as follows:
From the broker to both WFAL and Citibank:
ippine government issued a decree prohibiting the repayment of
principal on all foreign loans without prior approval from the Philip-
pine central bank.199 Citibank Manila consequently did not repay its
debt to WFAL upon maturation. After WFAL filed suit, Citibank
Manila received permission to use non-Philippine based assets to re-
pay its loan and repaid almost half of its debt.200 Both the district
court and the court of appeals found in favor of WFAL, however, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court.20 '
The question presented in Citibank was "whether the home office
of a United States bank is obligated to use its general assets to repay
a Eurodollar deposit made at one of its foreign branches, after the
foreign country's government has prohibited the branch from making
repayment out of its own assets."202 The Court noted a two-tier ap-
proach to this issue. First, a court must look for explicit contractual
terms allocating sovereign risk.203 This task was made simpler by the
Supreme Court's apparent approval of the district court's definition
of "repayment" and "collection." Repayment was defined as "refer-
ring to the location where the... [actual] repayment at maturity [is]
to occur."204 Collection was defined as "refer[ring] to the place or
places where [the depositor is] entitled to look for satisfaction of its
deposits in the event that [the debtor branch] should fail to make the
required [payment] at the place of repayment." 205 Second, in the ab-
"'Pay: Citibank, N.A. New York Account Manila",
"'Repay: Wells Fargo International, New York Account Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.,
Singapore Account #003-023645."' Citibank, 110 S. Ct. at 2037.
From the broker to WFAL:
"'Settlement - Citibank NA NYC AC Manila"'
"'Repayment - Wells Fargo Bk Intl NYC Ac Wells Fargo Asia Ltd Sgp No 003-
023645.'" Id
From WFAL to Citibank Manila:
"'We shall instruct Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York our correspondent please pay
to our a/c with Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York to pay to Citibank NA customer's
correspondent USD 1,000,000.'" I&
From Citibank Manila to WFAL:
"'Please remit US Dir 1,000,000 to our account with Citibank New York. At ma-
turity we remit US Dlr 1,049,444.44 to your account with Wells Fargo Bank Intl
Corp NY through Citibank New York."' Id,
199. Id, at 2038. The Philippine government's Memorandum to Authorized Agent
Banks (MAAB 47) provided:
"Any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment of principal on all foreign
obligations due to foreign banks and/or financial institutions, irrespective of
maturity, shall be submitted to the Central Bank ... for prior approval."
Id,
200. Citibank, 110 S. Ct. at 2038.
201. Id. at 2042.
202. Id, at 2036.
203. Id. at 2041.
204. Id. at 2038.
205. Id
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sence of an explicit allocation of sovereign risk, the court must imply
such a term and impute liability to one of the parties.20 6 Since the
terms of the loan agreement in Citibank only covered repayment, the
implied collection site was at issue.
This question provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
decide where sovereign risk would lie, absent an express allocation
by contract. It declined to do so. Instead, the Court found the law to
be unsettled.2 0 7 Philippine law was not. proved, and the law of New
York, based largely on the divergence of the Garcia2 08 and Perez2°9
holdings, was found to be undecided.21o As to establishing a federal
common law standard, the Court found "it premature to consider...
the necessity for any rule of federal common law, or the preemptive
effect of federal statutes and regulations on bank deposits and
reserves."
21 1
III. CONCLUSION
The issue of allocation of sovereign risk is undecided. Courts gen-
erally find the home office is liable for the debts of its branches,
although no generally applicable rule has been established. This re-
sult is accomplished despite the apparent legislative intent to main-
tain a distinction between assets which are payable domestically and
abroad.212
. Courts have adopted several theories to establish the liability of
the home office. All seem to be based on a conception of the bank as
the guardian of its deposits. From Justice Cardozo's first articulation
in Sokoloff: "He paid his money ... on the security of all its assets,
here as well as elsewhere,"213 through Garcia 214 and the Vietnamese
cases,2 15 the courts have placed the role of protector upon the bank.
While the case of interbank lending may alter the scenario, the main
policy concern is that debts be repaid.2 16 The burden is not a great
206. Id at 2041.
207. Id
208. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
209. Perez v. Chase Manhattan, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689
(1984).
210. Citibank, 110 U.S. at 2042.
211. Id
212. See supra notes 95-118.
213. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 167 (1924).
214. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
215. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
216. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola De Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 519
(2d Cir. 1985).
one to place on American banks. Despite the possibility of future
debt repayment moratoriums, as were found in Allied,217 Braka,218
and Citibank,219 banks may protect themselves. While the Supreme
Court has avoided deciding the basic issue of assumption of sovereign
risk, it has provided for a possible means of allocating such risk con-
tractually.220 Due to the deference given to a party's right to con-
tract, the simple inclusion of a contractual term such as, "collection is
limited solely to the borrowing branch office, collection may not be
obtained through any other office of this bank, including the home
office," may serve to protect the home office from liability. Such
terms are brief enough to be included in a telex without much diffi-
culty. In addition, banks may utilize the more modern convenience
of a telefax machine to allow for the inclusion of more contractual
terms in interbank transactions. Banks may further protect them-
selves by operating through locally incorporated subsidiaries, where
allowed, as opposed to branches. The American bank is viewed as
the protector of its depositors. If a bank does not wish to live up to
this heritage, it should clearly warn its potential depositors.
ADAM TELANOFF
217. Id.
218. Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
219. Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990).
220. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
